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1 Introduction
The controversy that opposed Borda (1784) and Condorcet (1785) is well known; indeed,
recent articles by Saari (2003, 2006) and Risse (2005)1 suggest that it is still very much alive.
The aggregation rules proposed by these two eighteenth-century scholars are very diﬀerent
in nature. The Borda rule is a scoring method that yields a unique ranking, although not
necessarily strict. The Condorcet binary procedure may yield a cyclic binary (majority)
relation, but when it does produce an unambiguous ranking - more precisely, an order - the
Condorcet rule is a maximum likelihood estimator of the true order, under the assumptions
that there is indeed a true order and that all judges or voters are able to order any two
alternatives as they are in the true order with the same probability. Young (1988) extends
the Condorcet result to the case where the majority relation is cyclic, by showing that the
most likely orders are the Kemeny orders.
Condorcet made a distinction between the most likely ranking and the alternative most
likely to be the best; so he was apparently aware that the alternative with the largest
probability of being the best is not necessarily the top alternative in the most likely ranking.
Young (1988) shows that indeed with a constant probability close to one half, the alternative
most likely to be the best is the Borda winner, which may be diﬀerent from the top alternative
in the most likely ranking.
Drissi and Truchon (2004) extend the above analyses by relaxing the assumption that
the probability of correctly ordering two alternatives is the same for all pairs of alternatives.
They let this probability increase with the distance between the two alternatives in the true
order, to reflect the intuition that a judge or voter is more prone to errors when confronted
to two comparable alternatives than when confronted to a good alternative and a bad one.
They make a thorough study of the case of three alternatives, using the class of logistic
probability functions defined by
p (k;α, β) =
eα+β(k−1)
1 + eα+β(k−1)
, with α > 0 and β ≥ 0, (1)
where k is the distance between two alternatives in the true order.
With {a, b, c} as the set of alternatives, and restricting themselves to the polls for which
abc is the unique Kemeny order, Drissi and Truchon show that abc is also the most likely
1See also the references within these articles.
order when α is suﬃciently large with respect to β. Otherwise, the most likely order may
be acb or bac. They also identify a subset of polls for which the Borda ranking turns out to
be the most likely order for all values of α and β. However, they did not realize that this
identity also holds for all polls when α = β. The purpose of this note is to prove this result2,
which is interesting in itself since it puts the Borda rule on the same footing as the maximum
likelihood rule, for a particular probability function. A parallel can also be drawn between
this result and Young’s result on the alternative most likely to be the best. Finally, in as
much as the Condorcet procedure belongs to the maximum likelihood tradition (Condorcet
approach was in fact one of the first application of the maximum likelihood approach), this
result may be seen as a reconciliation of the Borda and Condorcet methods.
2 The social choice problem
Let A = {1, 2, . . . ,m} be a set of alternatives or candidates to be ranked. Let us denote
the subset of complete weak orders or rankings (reflexive and transitive binary relations)
on A by R and the subset of (linear) orders (complete, transitive and asymmetric binary
relations) on A by L.3 A complete weak order on A can be represented in a rank form, that
is, by a vector r = (r1, r2, r3, . . .) , where r1 is the rank of alternative 1, r2 the rank of 2,
and so on. A complete weak order on A can also be represented in a sequence form, that is,
by a sequence s1s2 . . . , where s1 and s2 are the alternatives with ranks 1 and 2 respectively,
etc. In this form, parentheses are used to identify alternatives with the same rank, as in
ab(cde)fg.
To complete the problem, there is a set I = {1, 2, . . . , n} of voters or judges. Each is asked
to compare the alternatives pair by pair, as in the Condorcet procedure. His or her vote is
summarized in a matrix X i = [xist]s,t∈A . For any pair of alternatives (s, t) ∈ A2, xist = 1 if
voter i chooses s over t and xist = 0 otherwise, and x
i
st = 0 if s = t. Alternatively, we can
2Actually, the result is proved for an extension of the maximum likelihood rule that consists in replacing
multiple most likely orders by a single weak order in a sort of averaging process.
3I depart somewhat from Drissi and Truchon (2004) by introducing weak orders as well as linear orders.
I also allow aggregation rules to produce weak orders instead of linear orders. This happens quite often with
the Borda rule.
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ask each voter i to fill in X i according to the previous convention. Since only the aggregate
information will be needed, we define a poll by:
X =
nX
i=1
X i
Once voters or judges have expressed their opinions in a poll, the problem is to aggregate
these opinions in order to select a final ranking. The Borda rule and the maximum likelihood
rule are the two methods considered here to accomplish this aggregation.
The Borda rule is a scoring method with the vector of scores (m− 1,m− 2, . . . , 2, 1, 0).
An alternative s receives m − 1 points if it is ranked first by a voter, m − 2 if it is ranked
second, ..., and 0 points if it is last. These points are then aggregated across voters to give
the Borda score bs (X) of s.4 Alternatives are ordered according to these scores. Thus, the
ranking s1s2s3 . . . such that
bs1 (X) ≥ bs2 (X) ≥ bs3 (X) ≥ · · ·
is the Borda ranking. It is unique but it admits ties. Alternatively, given a poll X, the Borda
ranking is the weak order B (X) such that:
∀s, t ∈ A : Bs(X) ≤ Bt(X)⇔ bs (X) ≥ bt (X)
where Bs(X) it the rank of alternative s. B (·) is the Borda rule.
The maximum likelihood approach to vote aggregation, which was initiated by Condorcet
(1785), starts from the point of view that there exists a true order r ∈ L on the set of
alternatives. The true order, however, is not known. The role of voters or judges is to
provide an opinion as to what should be considered the true order. Their opinions are
collected in X i, i = 1, . . . , n. The vote of expert i on a pair of alternatives (s, t) is a random
variable xist ∈ {0, 1} , conditional on the true order r. Condorcet assumed that the votes are
independent between voters and pairs of alternatives. Moreover, each voter has the same
probability, say p¯ ∈
¡
1
2
, 1
¢
, of ordering correctly two alternatives and this probability is the
same for all pairs of alternatives. Now, given an order r and a poll X, let:
K (r;X) =
X
s,t∈A
rs<rt
xist
4Since bs (X) =
Pm
t=1 xst, it is legitimate to define the score of s as a function of the aggregate matrix X.
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Young (1988) shows that a most likely order is an order r∗ such that:
K (r∗;X) = max
r∈L
K (r;X)
Such an order is also known in the literature as a Kemeny order, after the contribution
of Kemeny (1959, 1962). The value of K (r;X), called the Kemeny score of r given X, is
the total number of agreements between r and the individual rankings making up profile X.
Drissi and Truchon (2004) maintain the assumption that votes are independent and that
each voter has the same probability of ordering correctly two alternatives. They also assume
that this probability is the same for any two couples of alternatives (s, t) , (u, v) ∈ A2 such
that rs− rt = ru− rv. However, this probability is a non-decreasing function of the distance
between the two alternatives in the true order. More precisely, they consider the class Pm
of non-decreasing functions p : {1, . . . ,m− 1}→ ¡1
2
, 1
¢
, where the domain is the set of the
possible distances between alternatives in the true order. Thus, given a true order r and two
alternatives s, t ∈ A such that rs < rt, the probability that a judge orders correctly these
two alternatives is given by p (rt − rs) .
Now, given a probability function p ∈ Pm, let
Lp (k) = ln
µ
p (k)
1− p (k)
¶
∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1} (2)
and for every order r and every poll X, consider the function:
Mp(r;X) =
m−1X
k=1

Lp (k)
X
s,t∈A
rt=rs+k
xst


As shown by Drissi and Truchon (2004), the most likely or most probable orders are the
elements of the set:
rp(X) = argmaxr∈L
Mp(r;X)
Clearly, rp (·) is another aggregation rule, the maximum likelihood rule with respect to the
function p.
Now, if p is defined by (1), we have:
p (k;α, β)
1− p (k;α, β) = e
α+β(k−1)
Thus, the function Lp defined in (2) takes the form:
L (k;α, β) = α+ β (k − 1)
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3 The result
Before stating and proving the result of this paper, the possibility of multiple most likely
orders must be addressed. One instance of this is when rp(X) contains two orders say r1 and
r2 that are identical except that, in the sequence form, r1 contains the subsequence s t while
r2 contains the subsequence t s. Since Mp(r1;X) = Mp(r2;X), it makes sense to declare s
and t ex aequo, that is, to replace both r1 and r2 by a single weak order r in which s t and
t s become (s t) . This means rs = rt in the rank form.
More generally, suppose that, for some κ ≥ 2 and 0 ≤ k ≤ m− κ, the set rp(X) contains
the order
s1 s2 . . . sksk+1sk+2 . . . sk+κsk+κ+1 . . . sm
as well as the orders obtained by permuting the κ alternatives in the subsequence
sk+1sk+2 . . . sk+κsk+κ+1,
for a total of κ! orders. Then, across these κ! orders, each alternative in {sk+1, sk+2, . . . , sk+κ}
occupies each rank from k + 1 to k + κ exactly (κ− 1)! times. Thus, it makes sense to
“average” these κ! orders, that is, to replace them by the single weak order
s1 s2 . . . sk (sk+1sk+2 . . . sk+κ) sk+κ+1 . . . sm
in which the alternatives sk+1, sk+2, . . . , sk+κ tie. In the rank form, one would have rsk+1 =
rsk+2 = · · · = rsk+κ. 5
The result to be proved assumes that the above averaging process is applied in due
circumstances. More precisely, let N be the set of all profiles and rwp : N → R be the
extension of rp obtained by replacing every maximal subset of orders in rp(X) that diﬀer
only by the permutation of adjacent alternatives, by a single weak order in which these
alternatives tie. This extension is the object of the proposition that follows.
Proposition 1 The extension rwp of the maximum likelihood rule rp, with p defined by (1)
and α = β, coincides with the Borda rule.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let r = (1, 2, . . . ,m) be a ranking from rwp (X) and let
α = β = 1. Then, Lp (k) = k and
Mp(r;X) =
m−1X
u=1
mX
v=u+1
(v − u)xuv
5For more on the multiplicity of most likely orders, see Truchon (2004).
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Next, consider an alternative s < m and another ranking rˆ obtained from r by simply
interchanging the position of s and s+1.6 I shall show thatMp(r;X)−Mp(rˆ;X) = bs (X)−
bs+1 (X) . Since Mp(r;X) −Mp(rˆ;X) ≥ 0, it will follow that bs (X) − bs+1 (X) ≥ 0 and, by
transitivity of ≥, that bs (X) ≥ bt (X) ∀s, t ∈ A : s < t. Thus, r is the Borda ranking. In
particular, if Mp(r;X) −Mp(rˆ;X) = bs (X) − bs+1 (X) = 0, then, by definition of rwp , we
have rˆ = r, that is, alternatives s and s+1 tie in rˆ = r. This is consistent with the tieing in
the Borda ranking.
For the remaining of the proof, let t = s + 1. To ease reading, I shall use t instead of
s+ 1 as a subscript. The only diﬀerence between Mp(r;X) and Mp(rˆ;X) is that the terms
xus are replaced by xut for u = 1, . . . ,m. Although tedious, it is easy to check that:
Mp(r;X)−Mp(rˆ;X) =
s−1X
u=1
((s− u) (xus − xut) + (t− u) (xut − xus)) + (xst − xts)
+
mX
v=s+2
(v − s) (xsv − xtv) +
mX
v=s+2
(v − s− 1) (xtv − xsv)
=
s−1X
u=1
(xut − xus) + (xst − xts) +
mX
v=s+2
(xsv − xtv)
=
s−1X
v=1
(xsv − xtv) + (xst − xts) +
mX
v=s+2
(xsv − xtv)
=
mX
v=1
xsv −
mX
v=1
xtv
= bs (X)− bt (X)
The second equality results from the simplification of the first term. The third equality
follows from the fact that xus+ xsu = m. The fourth equality holds under the assumption
xss = xtt = 0. The last equality uses the well known, and easily checked, fact that bs (X) =Pm
v=1 xsv.
A priori, nothing guarantees that rwp (X) is a singleton. However, since the Borda ranking
is unique, we get the single-valuedness of rwp (X) as a corollary to the theorem.
Corollary 2 Consider the extension rwp of the maximum likelihood rule rp, with p defined
by (1) and α = β. Then, for any profile X, rwp (X) is a singleton.
6In this case, r and rˆ can be seen as both the rank and the sequence forms of the respective orders.
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